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Non-Technical Summary
While there is a broad literature on the general wage effect of training, little is known
about the effects of different types of training and about the effects for heterogeneous
training participants. This study therefore adds two aspects to the literature on earnings
effects of training. First, the earnings effect of training is calculated for different “types” of
employees, i.e. discriminating between qualification level, experience, job tenure, and other
personal and employer attributes. Second, we distinguish between the earnings impact of
different training forms. For our analysis, we use the “Qualification and Career survey”,
a rich German data set with information on 0.1 percent of all individuals employed in
Germany in 1998/1999. We use a one-step full information maximum likelihood and a two-
stage least squares estimation to regress the impact of training participation on earnings.
Hereby, we correct for the endogeneity of training participation using external instrumental
variables. By additionally using a broad list of employee and employer characteristics, we
try to avoid omitted variable bias.
We find that the impact of participation in training on income is significantly positive.
Training comprises any of the following: courses and seminars, participation in trade fairs,
lectures, on-the-job training, quality circles, special tasks, and reading of specialist litera-
ture. Correcting for the endogeneity bias, the average treatment effect increases from 0.10
to 0.15. The effect of training on earnings differs for heterogeneous agents. High-skilled
workers profit more from training than low-skilled workers, job entrants obtain a higher
earnings increase after participation in training than workers with a long job tenure, and
workers with a temporary contract profit less from training than those with a permanent
job contract.
The increase in the income effects of training if endogeneity is taken into account,
compared with the case where selection is assumed to be random, suggests that our in-
strumental variables reduce the measurement error in the OLS regression and capture het-
erogeneous training returns more properly. This is plausible because our dummy variable
for training inadequately captures training intensity and training effort. The alternative
possibility for this phenomenon, a negative selection into training, seems unlikely given
previous empirical evidence that training is seldomly remedial.
A factor analysis shows that our seven continuing vocational training types are highly
correlated and only two factors are independent. These factors can be labelled “external”
for participation at trade fairs, lectures, courses and seminars, and reading of specialist
literature and “internal training” for on the job training, quality circles, and special tasks.
Without controlling for endogeneity, external training has a significant positive impact
on wages, while the wage effect of internal training is insignificant. Taking endogeneity
into account and instrumenting the decision to participate in internal or external training,
the coefficient of external training rises from 0.05 to 0.13, while internal training stays
insignificant.
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Abstract
While there is a broad literature on the general wage effect of training, little is known
about the effects of different training forms and about the effects for heterogeneous training
participants. This study therefore adds two aspects to the literature on earnings effects
of training. First, the earnings effect of training is calculated for different “types” of
employees, i.e. discriminating between qualification level, experience, job tenure, and
other attributes. Second, we distinguish between the earnings impact of external and
internal training. For our analysis, we use the “Qualification and Career survey”, a rich
German data set with information on 0.1 percent of all individuals employed in Germany in
1998/1999. We use a one-step full-information maximum likelihood and a two stage least
squares estimation to regress the impact of training participation on earnings correcting for
the endogeneity of training participation. By using a broad list of employee and employer
characteristics, we try to avoid omitted variable bias. We find the training earnings mark-
up to be positively correlated with qualification and experience. The analysis of internal
and external training reveals that this result is driven by external training only. Internal
training does not have a significant earnings effect. The correction for selection into
training leads to an increase in the training coefficients and a decrease of its significance.
JEL classification: C31, J24, J31
Key words: continuing training, returns to training, endogeneity, employee heterogene-
ity, training forms
1 Introduction
According to the seminal work by Becker (1964) and Mincer (1974), individual variation
in wages and increasing wage profiles can be explained by differences in human capital and
by skill increases induced by experience and continuing vocational training. Training after
entering the labor force constitutes a major part of human capital investments (Heckman,
1999). If the investment is profitable, returns are higher than direct and indirect costs of
training. The rent from the investment in human capital can be captured by the employer,
by the employee or will be shared between the two parties.1 This depends, above all, on
who has paid for the training and on the bargaining power of employer and employee.
A large microeconomic literature analyzes the impact of continuing vocational training
investment on productivity and a small literature discusses the rent distribution. The
empirical literature can be separated in two parts, depending on the data used. With
firm data, the impact of training on productivity and profit is investigated, with employee
data, the effect of training on wages is estimated. This paper adds to the latter strand
of the literature. Its special emphasis is on the heterogeneity of the effects of different
training types and of different groups of training participants in Germany.
In studies on the impact of training on wages, usually training incidence is measured
and not the kind or specificity of training. Only some authors differentiate between on-
the-job and off-the-job training (Lynch, 1992; Pischke, 2001), employer provided and not
employer provided training (Blundell, Dearden and Meghir, 1999), formal and non-formal
training (Pfeiffer and Reize, 2001) and, following Becker, between general and specific
training (Loewenstein and Spletzer, 1997). Assuming that turnover costs do not exist,
the wage effects of general and specific training should differ. Firm-specific training does
not increase the productivity of workers in other jobs, and therefore no wage increase is
necessary to keep the worker in the present job. In contrast, general training increases
the productivity of a worker in at least one other job. Therefore, employees may profit
from general training by increased wages. As a consequence, it can be assumed that the
impact of training on wages depends on the degree of specificity of the training received
(Lynch, 1992 or Blundell et al., 1999). In practice, it is not trivial to distinguish between
general and specific training, however, since continuing vocational training often comprises
both (Booth and Snower, 1996, chapter 3). Lazear (2002) argues that there is no firm-
specific training; it is only the composition of the skills needed which is specific to firms.
The classifications “on-the-job” and “off-the-job”, “employer provided” and “not employer
provided” and “non-formal” and “formal training” are usually motivated as proxies for
training with more firm-specific elements (on-the-job, employer provided and non-formal)
and more general training (off-the-job, not employer provided and formal), which is easier
portable between jobs. Overall, empirical studies find that training measures with higher
general contents have a stronger productivity effect than training measures with higher
1If externalities exist, also other agents (e.g. consumer, other employees, other firms) can profit from
the investment.
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firm-specific contents.2 The empirical evidence is not clear cut as can be seen in table 9
and will be discussed later.
Not only the type of training may have an impact on earnings, but also the type of
training participant. Heckman (1999) suggests that trainability increases with qualification
and tenure and that the effect of training on productivity is larger for higher educated
employees. Therefore, it can be assumed that the qualification level and tenure as well as
maybe other characteristics might have an impact on the returns to training. Nevertheless,
only few empirical studies discriminate between the wage effect for different groups of
employees by estimating separate regressions for each group. Lynch (1992) calculates the
training impact of different training types separately for different education groups, gender,
and unionized versus non-unionized workers. Pannenberg (1998) uses interaction terms of
training and company tenure dummies and experience dummies to differentiate the impact
of training on income between employees with different company tenure and experience.
He reports that wage effects of training are highest for job entrants. Lynch (1992) finds
that the wage impact of training can be even negative for less educated employees, and
Blundell, Dearden and Meghir (1996) find that returns to training are highest for middle
or highly educated individuals.
Finally, there is wide agreement that the group of employees participating in training
is different from the group that does not with respect to unobservable characteristics
(Heckman, 1999; Card, 1999) . Employers might tend to offer training only to those
individuals who are more trainable, while better motivated individuals may be more likely
to pursue off-the-job training (Lynch, 1992). Bartel (1995) finds for technical and core
training3 that individuals whose salaries are higher than those of comparable individuals in
the same firms have a higher probability to attend training.4 Other authors also argue that
those individuals who are on a career path with rapidly growing income are more likely
to participate in training (Pannenberg, 1997; Pfeiffer and Reize, 2001; Pischke, 2001).
Therefore, adequate instrumental variables have to be found that explain the selection
into training participation to correct for treatment selection.
This study mainly adds two new aspects to the literature on earnings effects of train-
ing. First, we show that the earnings effect of training varies between different “types”
of employees, i.e. discriminating between qualification level, experience, job tenure, and
many other attributes. Second, we distinguish between the impact of internal and external
training measures on earnings. In both cases, the endogeneity of training participation
2Some authors have also analysed employment effects of different training types. As Fitzenberger
and Prey (1997) show for East Germany, training outside of the firm has a strong negative impact on
employment probabilities, while training in the firrm has a positive effect.
3“Core” training is mainly management and leadership training, development training mainly entails
presentation and communication workshops and management techniques, while technical programs include
project management, statistics, quality control, and computer programming.
4Hence, she labels these types of training as career advancement training. Development training is
remedial, however, i.e. the lower an individual’s relative wage status, the more likely he or she is to receive
this type of training.
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is corrected by using instrumental variables. For our analysis, we use a rich and repre-
sentative German data set with information on 0.1 percent of all individuals employed in
1998/1999 - the BIBB/IAB data set “Qualification and Career Survey”.
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, the theoretical background
and our econometric methods are briefly discussed. Then, we present the data set and
the variables used. This is followed by the empirical evidence, where we first present
some descriptive statistics. Second, we estimate the effect of training on the earnings of
heterogeneous participants in training, and third we distinguish between the wage effects
of internal and external training. After that, we compare our results to the findings of
the literature based on individual as well as on firm data. Finally, we conclude with a
summary of our results and an outlook for further research.
2 Background Discussion
In order to explain earnings, economists traditionally use the so-called Mincer equation,
a standard tool in human capital theory. Here, earnings are explained by schooling,
experience, experience-squared, and a constant5:
lnY = µ0 + β1S + β2EX + β3EX2 + e, (1)
where ln Y is the natural logarithm of earnings, S schooling, EX experience, EX2
experience-squared, and µ0 a constant. The error term is labelled e ∼N(0, σ2). Experience
enters also as a squared term in order to allow earnings to increase with experience with
a decreasing rate. In the standard Mincer equation, the growth of earnings over working
life, i.e. the experience wage profile, reflects workers returns to investments in human
capital and seniority wages (Franz, 2003). As Mincer puts it: “The human capital earnings
function contains, among other variables, years of (work) experience, (...), which enters in a
nonlinear fashion. Its coefficients are interpretable as postschool human capital investment
parameters” (Mincer, 1991, p. 32). This means, however, that postschool human capital
investments are proxied here by work experience or, in other words, left as a black box.
In order to open the black box, we use a dummy for continuing vocational training T as
an additional explanatory factor for earnings:
lnY = µ0 + αT + β1S + β2EX + β3EX2 + e. (2)
5A theoretical derivation of the standard Mincer equation from earnings defined by earnings capacity
minus training investments is provided by Franz (2003). Recently, Heckman, Lochner and Todd (2003)
have examined the theoretical foundations and empirical support for the Mincer earnings regression.
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Adding information on training to the basic Mincer earnings equation should take
away some of the explanatory power of the coefficients of work experience. Our data set
allows us to capture part of the observable individual heterogeneity left in standard Mincer
equations by using a large variety of additional explanatory variables,X, such as workplace
characteristics, professional career and personal characteristics of the employee6:
lnY = µ0 + αT + β1S + β2EX + β3EX2 + β4X + e. (3)
In the introduction, we argued that the earnings impact of training may crucially
depend on the kind of training the employees receive and also on characteristics of the
training participants. Therefore, we include a full set of interaction terms between training
and employee characteristics in order to allow for group-specific returns to training. This
specification, suggested by Wooldridge (2002), allows us to calculate the average treatment
effect of training and to show that the effect on earnings varies for employees with different
professional careers, workplace characteristics, school attainment, professional status, and
other characteristics:
lnY = µ0 + αT + β1S + β2EX + β3EX2 + β4X + δ1T (S − S)
+δ2T (EX −EX) + δ3T (EX2 −EX
2
) + δ4T (X −X) + e. (4)
Employees who participate in training are not randomly selected. We show in the in-
troduction that unobservable employee characteristics, such as intrinsic motivation, career
orientation or social behavior, influence both, earnings and training participation. There-
fore, the impact of training included as a dummy variable in an OLS earnings equation
tends to be biased, because the error term of the earnings equation might be correlated
with the probability of receiving company training. To consider the effect of an endoge-
nously chosen binary treatment (training), we estimate a treatment effect model that is
conditional on two sets of independent variables explaining ln Y and T . The treatment
equation measures the unobserved net benefit to the individual and employer from pro-
viding training, T ∗. Assuming that firms offer training only if the net benefit is positive,
we find:
T ∗ = Zg + u > 0 (5)
T = 1 if T ∗ > 0
T = 0 if T ∗ ≤ 0,
where Z is a vector of individual and employer characteristics not included in X, deter-
mining whether an individual takes part in training or not, and the error term u ∼N(0,1),
6Bartel (1995) includes objective measures of firm performance and information about the relative wage
status of the individual (compared to other employees in the same job) to eliminate the heterogeneity bias
in the estimation of the impact of training on wages and job performance.
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corr(e, u) = ρ. If Z indicates participation in training, we estimate by IV, using as instru-
ments constant, Z, S,EX,EX2,X, and interactions of Z with all demeaned covariates.
For consistency, we must assume that the covariance conditional on (S,EX,EX2, X, Z)
is constant, which might not be exactly but approximately true (Wooldridge, 2002).
Most data sets do not provide suitable additional variables that meet the requirements
for qualifying them as identifying variables in an instrument regression. In the case of panel
data, lagged values or differences of the explaining variable in question are often used as
instruments.7 This strategy is problematic, however, because the instruments are often
only weakly correlated with the endogenous variables. Therefore, it is preferable to use
external instruments z that intuitively explain the selection process in the establishment
and are correlated with training incidence but not with earnings (Griliches and Mairesse,
1998).
The one-step full-information maximum likelihood estimator (FIML) is based on the
entire system of equations and treats all equations and all parameters jointly. With nor-
mally distributed disturbances, the estimator is more efficient than the two stage least
squares (2SLS) estimator. To test the robustness of our specification, we use both, FIML
and Heckman’s two-step consistent estimator. Our preferred estimation equation therefore
contains the instrumented training coefficient:
lnY = µ0 + αbT ∗ + β1S + β2EX + β3EX2 + β4X
+δ1 bT ∗(S − S) + δ2 bT ∗(EX −EX)
+δ3 bT ∗(EX2 −EX2) + δ4 bT ∗(X −X) + e, (6)
where bT ∗ is the estimated participation in training from (5).
In order to take heterogeneity in the wage effect of different training types into account,
we additionally differentiate between training forms. A factor analysis (see below) shows
that there are two independent bundles of training forms that can intuitively be labelled:
internal training, Ti, and external training, Te. Analogously to the approach described
above, we estimate:
lnY = µ0 + α1Ti + α2Te + β1S + β2EX + β3EX2 + β4X
+δ1Ti(s− s) + δ2Ti(EX −EX) + δ3Ti(EX2 −EX
2
)
+δ4Ti(X −X) + δ1Te(S − S) + δ2Te(EX −EX)
+δ3Te(EX2 −EX
2
) + δ4Te(X −X) + e. (7)
7Lynch (1992), for example, uses “somewhat artificial exclusions of explanatory variables” (p. 309) in
order to cure the endogeneity of training participation, while Goux and Maurin (2000) use time lags for
identification.
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When distinguishing between internal and external training in the second part of the
empirical analysis, we again account for the endogeneity of training by using external
instrumental variables, Z, analogously to the model presented above.
lnY = µ0 + α1 bT ∗i + α2 bT ∗e + β1S + β2EX + β3EX2 + β4X
+δ1 bT ∗i (S − S) + δ2 bT ∗i (EX −EX) + δ3 bT ∗i (EX2 −EX2)
+δ4 bT ∗i (X −X) + δ1 bT ∗e (S − S) + δ2 bT ∗e (EX −EX)
+δ3 bT ∗e (EX2 −EX2) + δ4 bT ∗e (X −X) + e, (8)
where bT ∗i and bT ∗e are the jointly estimated probabilities to participate in external or
internal training.
The quintessence of this paper is to test the hypothesis that the impact of training
on earnings depends on employee and workplace characteristics and also on the type of
training. In the following section, the data and variables we use for the empirical estimation
are described.
3 Data
In order to analyze the impact of training on earnings empirically, we use a rich data
set, compiled from a representative sample of 0.1 percent of all individuals employed in
Germany. The BIBB/IAB “Qualification and Career survey” (“Berufliche Qualifikation
und Erwerbsarbeit”) is jointly ascertained by the Research Institute of the Federal Labor
Office (Institut fu¨r Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung, IAB Nu¨rnberg) and the Federal
Institute for Vocational Training (Bundesinstitut fu¨r Berufsbildung, BIBB Berlin). The
survey is implemented every seven years, but it is not a panel. We will use the latest wave
available, which is from the survey in 1998/99. It comprises more than 34.000 employees.
The cross-section data on employed individuals in Germany contain detailed information
on the qualification and the professional career of each individual, the organizational and
technological environment of jobs, and the qualifications demanded for jobs. Furthermore,
information about the employer and some personal attributes are included. Specifically,
we use the following variables (see also table A1 in the appendix for the complete list with
detailed descriptions and table A11 for a German translation of selected variables):
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• The endogenous variable is log midpoints of earnings from 18 categories.8
• The key explanatory variable is participation in training during the last two years.
On the one hand, it is asked whether the individual participated in courses or semi-
nars. On the other hand, participation in different training categories is ascertained,
such as participation in fairs, lectures, on-the-job training, specific company training,
or taking over special tasks as well as reading technical literature.9 By combining
both questions, we obtain a dummy for participation in training. In addition, we
selected those six specific training forms mentioned above from the second question
plus participation in courses and seminars in order to calculate the different wage
effect of these training forms. An important measurement problem of our training
variables is that they do not include information on the length and costs of the
training attended.
• Furthermore, individuals were asked to state in which specific fields they need further
training. This information will be used for our external identifying variables for the
participation in training courses, because it will be shown that these variables are
correlated with training but not with wages.
• The second set of external identifying variables originates from questions on the
changes in the workplace, such as downsizing or restructuring.
• Further explanatory variables are those found in the Mincer equation from the pro-
fessional life, i.e. actual work experience10, job tenure, former unemployment, and
dummies for the highest educational achievement.
• Along with these standard variables, we also include some dummies capturing the
professional status, such as blue-collar or white-collar worker, civil servant or differ-
ent sophistication levels of tasks.
• In addition, we use the following job characteristics: computer use, profit-sharing,
bonus payments, overtime work, whether a job is temporary, and main job contents.
8The first category includes all earnings below 600 DM, the second includes earnings from 600 DM
until 1,000 DM. The following categories comprise earnings intervals of 500 DM up to 6,000 DM. From
6,000 DM to earnings of 10,000 DM, the intervals are in steps of 1,000 DM. The next category comprises
earnings from 10,000 DM until 15,000 DM and the last category includes all earnings of 15,000 DM, and
above. Most earnings can be found in the categories between 3,000 DM and 5,000 DM, see table A1 in the
appendix for descriptive statistics.
9There are two questions on the participation in continuing training. First, “Please think about the
last five years, i.e. the time from 1994 until today. Did you attend during this time any seminars or
courses which serve your continuous process of education?” Here, only those workers who participated
in training during the last two years are included. Second, “Which of the following possibilities to take
part in continuous training did you use during the last two years, i.e. from the beginning of 1997 onward,
in order to aquire additional knowledge?” Here, eight training categories are included. We chose not to
use two of these categories, “internship” and “other kinds of training”, because it is unclear what kind of
training on the job is behind these variables.
10We have information about the time when the job market was entered, and we include dummies for
discontinuations like unemployment or maternity leave.
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These variables allow us to control a large part of the individual heterogeneity be-
tween the employees.11 Some of these variables (for example working overtime) can
be interpreted as indicators for intrinsic motivation.
• Additional control variables explaining earnings are personal attributes. We include
a dummy for children and German nationality.
• Finally, we also control for the size of community the individual lives in and the firm
size. Dummies for German states (“La¨nder”) and dummies indicating the economic
sector of the employer are included.
Only employees in West Germany are included, because in 1998 there were still large
differences in the labor market structures of the two parts of the country.12 The analysis
is restricted to male employees, because the data do not allow us to model participation
in the labor market simultaneously, which would be important for examining earnings
effects for women. Hours worked vary widely in the data and we found a number of
implausibly high reported values. Therefore, we only use full-time13 employees and do not
take reported working hours into account.14
In order to obtain clean evidence on the earnings effects of employee training, we
include only those workers who received training from their current employer. This means
that we exclude all employees who have participated in training during the last two years
and changed the employer during this period. The reason for this restriction in our sample
is that our data do not give information whether training was provided by an employer
or whether it was sponsored by the government and aimed at unemployed. Fitzenberger
and Speckesser (2000) note that the effects of training sponsored by the government for
unemployed and training paid by private enterprises should be analyzed separately.
Before turning to the estimation of our extended Mincer equation, the specificity of
the data has to be taken into account. In our data set, the information on income is
given in interval-coded data, i.e. the income is registered by 18 narrow intervals (see the
description above). In order to estimate the earnings equation consistently, we therefore
need to make a distributional assumption. On the one hand, we can use an interval
regression which estimates the coefficients and variances by maximum likelihood, such as
ordered probit with fixed cut points. The coefficients can be interpreted here as if we
had observed the exact income for each individual and estimated the earnings regression
by OLS. The underlying assumption which allows us to use the ordered probit estimator
is that earnings, given the set of explanatory variables, satisfys the assumptions of the
11Some of these variables may also be endogenous in the earnings equation. We do not control this,
however, because the variables mainly serve as control variables for employee heterogeneity.
12See Gang and Yun (2002) or Riphahn (2001).
13We include only employees working 30 hours and above per week. Only 2.6 percent of the males work
less than 30 hours. Also, we use a dummy for working overtime in order to take hours worked into account.
14The results do not change qualitatively, however, if we use log hourly wages instead of log earnings as
the dependent variable.
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classical linear regression model. We take log earnings as cell limits because earnings are
strictly positive (Wooldridge, 2002). On the other hand, we can employ an OLS regression,
simply taking the log of the mean value of each earnings category. Here, we assume that on
average individual earnings in one category are the mean value of this interval. We do not
find any differences in coefficients between exploratory interval and OLS regressions. In
addition, the t-values of the OLS regression are very close to those of the interval regression
and the standard errors only slightly deviate (the estimation results for these robustness
checks are presented in table A2 in the appendix). For convenience and since the results
are not influenced by the estimation method used, we will take the log midpoints of the
earnings categories and estimate the earnings equation with OLS techniques instead of
using maximum likelihood methods in the following analysis (see also Pfeiffer and Reize,
2001).
4 Empirical Evidence
This section consists of three parts. First, we present some descriptive statistics and show
some robustness tests to introduce the data set. In the second part, the earnings effect
of a training dummy is evaluated. And third, we estimate the earnings effect of different
training types.
4.1 Descriptive Statistics
In table 1, participation in seven different training forms are shown for full-time working
men. In total, 55 percent of males participated in some kind of training. As any kind
of training within two years is included here, this data set reports higher participation in
training than other German data sets.15 Relying on the German SOEP, Pischke (2001)
for example reports that 31 percent of employed males participated in any training in
1986. Participation rates of males in our selected training forms differ between 13 and
26 percent.16 About 13 percent of the males report to be assigned to jobs including
special tasks in order to extend their skills and gain experience and 14 percent participate
in quality circles. Around 17 percent of the male full-time workers obtain on-the-job
training, 18 percent attend trade fairs, and 26 percent attend seminars and presentations
on specific topics or read technical literature.
15According to the German ministry of education and research, “Bundesministerium fu¨r Bildung und
Forschung (BMBF)”, no uniform statistics on training exist. There are several official sources (Mikrozensus,
SOEP, IAB-Betriebspanel, CVTS, and IW-Erhebung) reporting different numbers (Kuwan et al., 2003).
16For all types of training, we observe a larger attendance of men than of women. This difference in
participation of women and men becomes much stronger when we include also part-time workers which
are mostly women.
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As can be seen from the correlation matrix in the appendix (table A3), individuals
often take part in several kinds of training, and therefore some training forms are highly
correlated with each other. Specifically, those employees reading technical literature are
rather likely to visit also trade fairs and to attend seminars and presentations. This
means that we cannot discern the earnings influences of all individual training measures.
A factor analysis allows the separation of independent factors underlying the individual
training forms, however. The factor analysis in table 2 reports that the 7 categories of
training can be divided into two independent factors with eigen values above 1. These two
factors explain 52 percent of the total variation. We can intuitively distinguish between
internal training, including participation in on-the-job training, company programs, and
the assignment of special tasks, and external training, including courses and seminars,
the visit of trade fairs, the attendance of seminars, and reading of specialist literature.
Tentatively, we argue that internal training has a higher share of specific training content
in comparison to our external training measures.
Table 1: Participation in Training
Type of Training Men in % N=9800
Courses and Seminars 26.72
Trade Fair 18.09
Lecture 25.90
Specialist Literature 26.11
Quality Circle 14.07
Special Tasks 12.86
On-The-Job Training 16.70
Any Kind of Training 55.43
Source: BIBB-IAB 1998/99, own 
calculations.
Table 2: Rotated Component Matrixa of Factor Analysis: Types of Training
Factor Factor Value Variables Factorloadingsb
1: External Training 2.54 Trade Fair 0.78 (-0.22)
Lecture 0.81 (-0.01)
Specialist Literature 0.76 (-0.00)
Courses and Seminars 0.61 (0.20)
2: Internal Training 1.07 On-The-Job 0.81 (-0.19)
Quality Circle 0.55 (0.14)
Special Tasks 0.53 (0.19)
Notes: a The factors have been rotated by promax.
b In the brackets, you find the factor loading of the factor not chosen.
Source: BIBB-IAB 1998/99, own calculations.
Participation in training also depends on the qualification of the employee. In table
3, the attendance of any kind of training is sorted by qualification. Analogously to the
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literature (Blundell, Dearden and Meghir, 1996; Heckman, 1999; Pischke, 2001; Pfeiffer
and Brade, 1995), we find that individuals with higher education participate more often in
training, and private sector training mainly excludes low-skilled persons. This applies to
school attainment as well as to professional or vocational training. Attendance in training
of employees without a professional degree is lowest, only 28 percent have participated in
some kind of training. In contrast, 85 percent and more of the employees with a university
degree have taken part in continuing vocational training during the last two years.
Table 3: Participation in Training (sorted by qualification)
Education Men in %
N = 9800
Without School Leaving Certificate 39,88
Lower Secondary School 42,69
Intermediate Secondary School 62,31
Entrance Examination for University for Applied 
Sciences
81,64
High School Diploma 78,60
Without Professional Degree 27,88
Full-Time Vocational School 51,15
Apprenticeship 50,45
Master Craftman 76,60
University for Applied Sciences 87,31
University 84,96
Total 55,43
Source: BIBB-IAB 1998/99, own calculations.
Full-time working males.
School Attainment
Professional/Vocational Training
In order to check the robustness of our results with respect to the specification, we first
estimate a slightly modified Mincer equation, with log earnings as the endogenous variable
and including experience, experience-squared and a set of dummy variables, indicating
primary and secondary education as controlling variables. The results of the Mincer
equation are in line with similar studies for Germany (see Franz, 2003).17 As expected,
income is higher for workers with more experience, but it increases at a decreasing rate
since the coefficient for experience-squared is negative. With more school attainment and
higher professional degrees, income increases (compare table A4).
As expected, adding the training dummies to the basic earnings equation takes away
some of the explanatory power of the coefficients of work experience and decreases the
coefficients of the school attainment and professional degree dummies. The coefficients
of the education variables decrease in the extended Mincer equation, because training re-
places some of the knowledge or adds to what has been learned in school and professional
17Even though the estimations in Franz (2003, chapter 3) are based on a pooled sample (1984 - 1993)
from the German SOEP, coefficients and t-values are very close to our results.
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education. If we differentiate between different training forms, the coefficient of training
on the job is the only training variable with a negative, albeit insignificant coefficient, all
others are positive. The additional information on investments in human capital increases
the adjusted R2 of the OLS regression from 32 to 38 percent. With a large number of
variables controlling for firm and job characteristics and some other attributes, the coef-
ficients of experience and experience-squared are unchanged but their t-values decrease.
In addition, the coefficients of school attainment, vocational training, and continuing vo-
cational training dummies as well as their t-values decrease. Here, the adjusted R2 rises
to 50 percent, indicating that the variables controlling for workplace and personal charac-
teristics, professional career, professional status, and other attributes uncover part of the
sample heterogeneity, which is unobserved in the standard Mincer equation (see tables A4
and A5 in the appendix).
4.2 Earnings Effect of Training Participation
In this section, we present our estimation results on the effect of participation in training
during the previous two years on earnings. We find that training significantly increases
earnings on average by five percentage points, see table A6. It is well-known from the lit-
erature that training participants differ from those employees who do not receive training.
In order to validate this, we use a Chow test for the equality of the two sets of coefficients
in linear wage regression models, to check whether the coefficients differ between partici-
pants and non-participants in training. As suggested by Card (1999), the test reveals that
participants and non-participants not only differ in their earnings but also in several other
aspects, and therefore the earnings equations should be estimated separately for training
participants and non-participants.18 Another alternative is to add interaction terms of
the training dummy with all covariates. The inclusion of a full set of interaction terms
allows us to estimate one wage regression for both groups in this specification, since a joint
estimation of separate coefficients of participants and non-participants for all covariates
is possible. The results of the wage equation including the interaction variables can be
seen in table A7 in the appendix. The average treatment effect, i.e. the wage effect for
an employee with reference characteristics (all dummies are zero), with mean professional
experience (22 years) and mean tenure in the firm (14 years) is 6 percent. Therefore,
earnings are on average by 6 percentage points higher for participants in training than
for non-participants according to this specification. Depending on the qualification of the
individual and some job attributes, the impact of training on earnings is higher or lower
than the average treatment effect, however. We will discuss in detail below that high qual-
ified and experienced employees profit much more from training than low-skilled workers
just entering the labor market.
In order to evaluate the impact of training on earnings properly, we have to take the
18The test statistic is: F(110, 8103) = 2.83 Prob > F = 0.0000.
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endogeneity of training into account. We instrument the training dummy and estimate a
treatment effect model using one-step full information maximum likelihood. The determi-
nants of participation are shown in the probit equation (table 4). Investments in human
capital tend to be greater when (1) the expected earnings are greater, (2) the initial in-
vestment costs are lower, and (3) the investor has longer time to recoup the investment
(Heckman, 1999). People with the ability to learn quickly are more likely to seek out and
be presented by employers with learning opportunities. They are usually people who, be-
cause of their abilities, were best able to reap the benefits of formal schooling. This implies
that those who invested more in schooling are likely to invest more in post-school training.
In the literature on participation in training, besides years of schooling, firm size, length
of job tenure, work experience, part-time working, unionization, and the level of technol-
ogy used in the industry have been found as main determinants (Booth, Francesconi and
Zoega, 2003; Gerlach and Jirjahn, 1998; Lynch and Black, 1998; Mincer, 1991; Pfeiffer and
Brade, 1995; Pfeiffer and Reize, 2001; Shields, 1998; Goux and Maurin, 2000). We also
find these variables to be crucial: highly skilled employees and also those employees who
work with a personal computer and in larger firms receive training more often than oth-
ers. Additionally, we calculate the probability to attend training depending on experience
and firm tenure and thereby confirm the result of Pfeiffer and Reize (2001): employees
attend continuing vocational training more frequently with a longer company tenure (but
on a decreasing scale). With more work experience, participation in training decreases,
it is highest for job entrants (see figure A1 in the appendix). Furthermore, we find that
employees who work overtime or who receive incentive wages participate more often in
training. These variables may be indicators for intrinsic motivation of the employee which
may also be positively correlated with training incidence (Heckman, 1999). Participa-
tion probability increases with the professional status while employees with non-German
nationality generally obtain continuing vocational training less frequently. Regional and
sectoral labor market conditions are captured by 10 dummies for German states and 46
dummies for the economic sectors.
Our external identifying variables which determine participation in training but are
uncorrelated with earnings are, first, the subjective need for specific training types. This
especially applies to the need for training in job-specific areas, such as presentation tech-
niques, management topics, computer technology or finance. A greater need for these
training forms indicates that individuals have already participated. If, persons have a
need for training in general topics, however, such as mathematics, they have less frequently
participated in training during the last two years. This suggests that these individuals
have also had a need for basic training in the past but that firms are not willing to provide
this kind of training (Heckman, 1999). Our second set of external identifying variables
indicates whether any restructuring has been taken place in the firm, such as downsizing
or restructuring of the workplace.
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Table 4: Selection into Training - Endogenous Variable: Training Dummy
Unskilled Blue-Collar Worker Reference
Mathematics -0.17 (-1.81) * Skilled Blue-Collar Worker 0.14 (2.66) ***
German -0.00 (-0.04) Assistant Foreman 0.37 (3.99) ***
System Engineering 0.18 (1.71) * Master/Foreman 0.32 (3.06) ***
Computer Engineering 0.11 (1.72) * Unskilled White-Collar Worker 0.11 (1.13) 
Other Engineering 0.38 (0.62) *** White-Collar Worker with Simple Tasks 0.12 (1.44) 
Safety at Work 0.11 (1.85) * White-Collar Worker with Difficult Tasks 0.37 (5.68) ***
Medicine 0.23 (1.91) * High-Skilled White-Collar Worker 0.55 (8.01) ***
Executive White-Collar Worker 0.45 (4.66) ***
Downsizing 0.03 (0.54) Civil Servant in Clerical Grade 0.33 (3.30) ***
Restructuring 0.15 (2.97) *** Civil Servant in Higher Service 0.76 (5.81) ***
Civil Servant in Senior Service 0.97 (5.45) ***
Without School Leaving 
Certificate -0.02 (-0.21) Computer Work Station 0.25 (6.29) ***
Lower Secondary School -0.06 (-1.61) Temporary Work -0.27 (-3.56) ***
Intermediate Secondary School Reference Overtime 0.15 (4.17) ***
Entrance Examination for 
University for Applied Sciences 0.09 (1.21) Incentive Wage 0.17 (4.44) ***
High School Diploma -0.11 (-1.66) *
Without Professional Degree -0.10 (-1.01) Children 0.12 (3.73) ***
Full-Time Vocational School Reference Foreigner -0.16 (-2.45) **
Apprenticeship 0.05 (0.54) 
Master Craftman 0.28 (2.64) *** Number of Observations 9723
University for Applied Sciences 0.27 (2.20) ** LR chi2 (130) 2667.44
University 0.24 (1.89) * Pseudo R2 0.2834
Professional Experience -0.00 (-0.13) 
Professional Experience Squared -0.00 (-1.52) 
Company Tenure 0.04 (7.67) ***
Company Tenure Squared -0.00 (-6.08) ***
Unemployment 0.06 (1.60) 
Workplace Characteristics
Individual Characteristics
***, (**,*) signals a level of significance of 1% (5%, 
10%) (z-values in parentheses are based on 
heteroscedasticity robust standard errors)
Source: BIBB-IAB 1998/99, own calculations.
School Attainment
Following control variables have been added: size 
of firm (6), federal state (10), residence community 
(2), economic sector (46), demand for specific 
training (5), job contents (13) and a constant.
Changes in the Workplace
Vocational Training
Professional Career
Professional StatusIdentifying Variables
Training Needs
Education and Continuous Training
It is well known that firms offer more training after restructuring (Acemoglu and Pis-
chke, 1999; Zwick, 2004). Therefore, participation in training is higher if restructuring
has taken place in a firm. The results of the treatment wage regression are given in table
5. The standard variables in the earnings equation have again the expected coefficients:
earnings increase with professional experience on a decreasing scale and with higher pro-
fessional degrees and higher professional status. School attainment variables have the
expected coefficients but are, except for high school diploma, insignificant.19 Employees
have higher earnings when they work overtime, obtain profit-sharing and incentive wages.
The average treatment effect of training is a 15 percentage points difference in earnings
19The insignificance can be due to multicollineary with other covariates or it shows that for employees
who do not participate in training, schooling does not have an impact on earnings.
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for participants versus non-participants.20 Hence, after instrumenting for the selection
into training, the earnings effect of continuing vocational training is larger than in the
OLS estimation. This result is in line with other studies (Bartel, 1995; Pischke, 2001;
Pannenberg, 1997; Pfeiffer and Reize, 2001).
Table 5: Wage Effects of Training with Selectivity Correction - Treatment
Effect Model
Training 0.15 (3.61) *** Children 0.04 (2.40) **
Foreigner -0.05 (-1.97) **
Without School Leaving 
Certificate 0.41 (0.99) 
Lower Secondary School 0.04 (1.65) *
Intermediate Secondary School Reference Professional Experience 0.02 (2.93) ***
Entrance Examination for 
University for Applied Sciences 0.00 (0.01) Professional Experience Squared -0.00 (-1.40) 
High School Diploma 0.09 (1.88) * Company Tenure -0.02 (-4.52) ***
Company Tenure Squared 0.00 (3.97) ***
Without Professional Degree -0.17 (-2.43) ** Computer Work Station 0.03 (0.76) 
Full-Time Vocational School Reference Temporary Work -0.10 (-1.29) 
Apprenticeship -0.05 (-0.74) Good Economic Situation 0.07 (2.32) **
Master Craftman -0.02 (-0.28) Overtime -0.03 (-1.06) 
University for Applied Sciences -0.02 (-0.13) Profit-Sharing 0.11 (2.15) **
University -0.01 (-0.1) Incentive Wage -0.05 (-1.52) 
Without School Leaving 
Certificate -0.07 (-0.92) 
Professional Experience 0.01 (1.70) * Lower Secondary School -0.11 (-3.02) ***
Professional Experience Squared -0.00 (-1.76) *
Entrance Examination for 
University for Applied Sciences 0.06 (0.94) 
Company Tenure 0.02 (5.86) *** High School Diploma -0.00 (-0.05) 
Company Tenure Squared -0.00 (-4.28) ***
Unemployment -0.00 (-0.14) Skilled Blue-Collar Worker 0.01 (0.13) 
Assistant Foreman -0.04 (-0.37) 
Master/Foreman -0.01 (-0.11) 
Unskilled Blue-Collar Worker Reference Unskilled White-Collar Worker -0.07 (-0.74) 
Skilled Blue-Collar Worker 0.05 (1.75) * White-Collar Worker with Simple Tasks -0.14 (-1.25) 
Assistant Foreman 0.08 (1.58) White-Collar Worker with Difficult Tasks -0.13 (-1.29) 
Master/Foreman 0.16 (2.47) ** High-Skilled White-Collar Worker 0.15 (1.49) 
Unskilled White-Collar Worker 0.09 (2.30) ** Executive White-Collar Worker 0.18 (1.23) 
White-Collar Worker with Simple 
Tasks 0.07 (1.57) Civil Servant in Clerical Grade -0.17 (-1.47) 
White-Collar Worker with Difficult 
Tasks 0.18 (3.29) *** Civil Servant in Higher Service -0.15 (-0.66) 
High-Skilled White-Collar Worker 0.07 (1.23) Civil Servant in Senior Service -0.29 (-0.77) 
Executive White-Collar Worker 0.14 (1.37) 
Civil Servant in Clerical Grade 0.16 (2.42) ** Number of Observations 8325
Civil Servant in Higher Service 0.22 (1.16) Chi-squared Stat. 10577.43
Civil Servant in Senior Service 0.51 (1.47) 
Computer Work Station 0.01 (0.48) 
Temporary Work -0.22 (-0.64) 
Good Economic Situation 0.00 (0.16) 
Overtime 0.06 (3.05) ***
Profit-Sharing -0.01 (-0.21) 
Incentive Wage 0.05 (2.31) **
Interaction Variables
Individual CharacteristicsEducation and Continuous Training
School Attainment
Vocational Training
***, (**,*) signals a level of significance of 1% (5%, 
10%) (z-values in parentheses are based on 
heteroscedasticity robust standard errors)
Source: BIBB-IAB 1998/99, own calculations.
Following control variables have been added: size 
of firm (6), federal state (10), residence community 
(2), economic sector (46), demand for specific 
training (5), job contents (13) and a constant.
Professional Career
Workplace Characteristics
Professional Status
Professional Status
School Attainment
20The two-step Heckman selection correction model gives quantitatively the same result. Here the
estimated training coefficient is 18 percentage points.
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This increase in the coefficient may be the consequence of three effects familiar from
the returns to education literature (Card, 1999). First, there might be a negative selection
into training: individuals with lower earnings are more likely to take part in training, and
training therefore is remedial. This is contrary to most of the literature, however: Goux
and Maurin (2000) show that high-wage workers are more likely to be selected for training
than other workers. Dearden, Reed and Van Reenen (2000), in contrast, argue that the
productivity effect is underestimated when treating training as exogenous since it is often
adopted in “bad times”, when productivity is low. Second, training might be measured
with errors, and the OLS earning estimation may therefore be downward biased (Griliches
and Hausman, 1986). These errors decrease by instrumenting the training variable if the
instruments capture part of the measurement errors. In our case, the training dummy is
indeed a rough measure, because a one day course has the same measure as a course that
takes several weeks. A third reason may be that the returns to training are heterogeneous21
(Card, 1999). It seems plausible that especially those employees who have a subjective need
for training or are happy with their past training experience can realize a higher income
increase after training. These employees might gain more human capital by training than
the others and therefore have a stronger productivity improvement (Harmon, Oosterbeek
and Walker, 2003). We cannot separate the impact of the individual biases on training
returns, and therefore it is unclear if training is remedial or not.
Table 6: Effect of Training on Earnings for Heterogeneous Employees
Average Treatment Effect 0.15 Average Treatment Effect 0.15
Professional Experience 3* -0.30 Professional Experience 3* -0.30
Professional Experience 
Squared 9 0.09
Professional Experience 
Squared 9 0.09
Company Tenure 2* 0.24 Company Tenure 2* 0.24
Company Tenure Squared 4 -0.13 Company Tenure Squared 4 -0.13
Without School Leaving 
Certificate -0.06
Entrance Examination for 
University of Applied Sciences 0.06
Temporary Work -0.09 Computer Work Station 0.02
Assistant Foreman -0.04 Employee with Difficult Tasks -0.12
Effect of Training: -0.14 Effect of Training: 0.00
Average Treatment Effect 0.15 Average Treatment Effect 0.15
Professional Experience 30* 0.12 Professional Experience 30* 0.12
Professional Experience 
Squared 900 -0.04
Professional Experience 
Squared 900 -0.04
Company Tenure 24* -0.21 Company Tenure 24* -0.21
Company Tenure Squared 576 0.12 Company Tenure Squared 576 0.12
Lower Secondary School -0.05 High School Diploma 0.00
Low-Level Employee -0.07 Civil Servant in Higher Service 0.13
Effect of Training: 0.02 Effect of Training: 0.27
* in years
Low skilled without experience High skilled without experience
Low skilled with experience High skilled with experience
21Heterogeneous not only with respect to observable but also to unobservable characteristics.
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Some authors estimated very high training coefficients with 0.4 and even above. They
explain the large size by the emphasis of the German wage bargaining system on the
acquisition of formal qualifications as a means for wage and productivity growth and state
that not training determines wages, but that those who attend training, are on a high
wage growth career path (Georgellis and Lange, 1997; Pfeiffer and Reize, 2001). Also,
Leuven and Oosterbeek (2002) argue that a large share of these estimated coefficients are
due to returns to some unobservable characteristics.
With the incorporated interaction variables, we capture part of the usually neglected
heterogeneous earnings effect of training.22 The impact of training on earnings is larger
for high-skilled workers, low-skilled workers gain less from training. Heckman (1999)
stresses that more able people acquire more skills and that more skilled people become
more able. Therefore, it seems not surprising that the productivity effect of training
is smaller for the less skilled who accordingly get a lower wage mark-up. Employees
with a long work experience gain more from training than persons who have just entered
the labor market. This might indicate that continuing vocational training refreshes or
updates primary vocational training and therefore is especially useful for older workers
whose primary education is partly obsolete. Besides the explanation that training is more
effective on the job for more experienced workers, these workers are also likely to have
more bargaining power than unexperienced workers and therefore can capture a larger
share if there are rents to divide.23 As already indicated by Lazear (1979), earnings and
productivity at a given point in the career do not have to correspond. He notes that
employees may first get wages that are lower than their productivity and at a later stage
of their professional career, they can profit from early investments in their human capital.
Also, long job tenure increases participation in continuing training but diminishes the
impact of training on income. Pannenberg (1998) determines wage differentials between
participants and non-participants depending on tenure and comes to the same result. In
his estimations, the wage effects are largest for the training that takes place two or three
years after entering a company. It seems plausible that the kind of training provided to
entrants in the firm increases productivity substantially since their demand for specific
training is strong. Additionally, job attributes matter for the income effect of training:
workers with temporary contracts do not obtain any wage mark-up or only a very small
one, depending on their professional experience and other attributes. The reason clearly
is that employers cannot profit from the increased productivity since the employees will
probably change their job soon and will share the rent from investment in human capital
with their next employer. One can even imagine that temporary workers implicitly pay
for part of their training by accepting lower earnings, because they expect this investment
in human capital to pay off later in form of a higher wage paid by the next employer.
22In contrast to our approach to distinguish only heterogeneous returns with respect to observable
characteristics, Maier, Pfeiffer and Pohlmeier (2003) allow for individual heterogeneity in the returns to
schooling.
23Muysken and Zwick (2003) argue that insiders might use up-skilling in order to skim rents.
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Some examples for earnings effects of training participation for different types of em-
ployees are provided in table 6. The effects are calculated from table 5 for specific het-
erogeneous agents. The differences in earnings for participants and non-participants in
training differ widely across qualification groups, professional career and job attributes.
In the examples we defined, low-skilled workers do not gain from training when they just
entered the job market and they might even have to pay for it by receiving a lower income.
Low-skilled workers with experience do not participate often, but if they attend training,
they do receive higher earnings. High-skilled workers gain from training, especially when
they have a long professional experience. Hence, heterogeneity between selected groups
of workers is important in this context and should be taken into account, not only when
estimating the selection into training but also in the earnings equation24. In addition, dif-
ferent training forms should be distinguished, which we have not done so far. In the next
section, we will therefore replace our training dummy with factors comprising different
types of training.
4.3 Earnings Effects of Different Types of Training
In the second part of our empirical analysis, we distinguish between selected training
forms. This is an attempt to differentiate between the wage effects of training forms with
more or less specific contents.
Table 7: Participation in Internal and External Training
Qualification Internal External 
Without School Leaving Certificate 29.17 40.83
Lower Secondary School 27.63 42.65
Intermediate Secondary School 38.37 62.41
Entrance Examination for University for 
Applied Sciences 44.09 81.88
High School Diploma 40.94 78.59
Without Professional Degree 19.46 27.06
Full-Time Vocational School 35.53 49.12
Apprenticeship 32.39 51.06
Master Craftman 43.93 78.50
University for Applied Sciences 46.40 86.72
University 41.04 85.66
Total 33.74 56.31
Source: BIBB-IAB 1998/99, own calculations.
School Attainment
Vocational Training
Full-Time working males in percent. Number of Observations: 9800
In table 7, participation in internal and external training is described by the level of
education. For internal training, there is the clear trend visible that high-skilled workers
24Ceteris paribus, the wage effect differences between employees with low and high experience and
between different skill levels are significant.
18
participate more often (about 40 percent) than low-skilled workers (about 30 percent). In
the case of external training, this tendency is even much more obvious: While 86 percent
of employees with a university degree take part in external training, less than 30 percent
of the unskilled (without professional degree) participate.
Table A8 in the appendix shows the results of the simple OLS earnings equation
including internal and external training. The impact of external training is significantly
positive, in contrast to internal training, which has no significant effect on earnings.25 The
coefficients of the other variables in the extended income equation are as expected and
similar to those found in the previous regression using the training dummy.
Table 8: Extended Earnings Equation with Training - Corrected for
Selectivity by Instrumental Variable Regression
External Training 0.13 (1.95) * Unskilled Blue-Collar Worker Reference
Internal Training -0.02 (-0.45) Skilled Blue-Collar Worker 0.02 (0.51) 
Assistant Foreman -0.04 (-0.67) 
Without School Leaving 
Certificate 0.01 (0.42) Master/Foreman 0.13 (2.09) **
Lower Secondary School -0.02 (-1.99) ** Unskilled White-Collar Worker 0.05 (0.95) 
Intermediate Secondary School Reference
White-Collar Worker with Simple 
Tasks -0.00 (-0.02) 
Entrance Examination for 
University for Applied Sciences 0.02 (0.72) 
White-Collar Worker with Difficult 
Tasks 0.11 (2.49) **
High School Diploma 0.06 (3.19) *** High-Skilled White-Collar Worker 0.12 (2.32) **
Executive White-Collar Worker 0.21 (2.82) ***
Without Professional Degree -0.03 (-0.86) Civil Servant in Clerical Grade 0.14 (2.93) ***
Full-Time Vocational School Reference Civil Servant in Higher Service 0.11 (1.46) 
Apprenticeship -0.04 (-1.23) Civil Servant in Senior Service 0.38 (2.95) ***
Master Craftman -0.01 (-0.15) 
University for Applied Sciences 0.05 (0.98) 
University 0.08 (1.53) Computer Work Station 0.03 (3.18) ***
Temporary Work -0.06 (-2.63) ***
Good Economic Situation 0.04 (4.93) ***
Professional Experience 0.01 (9.02) *** Overtime 0.03 (2.98) ***
Professional Experience 
Squared -0.00 (-6.52) *** Profit-Sharing 0.05 (2.99) ***
Company Tenure 0.00 (2.83) *** Incentive Wage 0.03 (2.82) ***
Company Tenure Squared -0.00 (-0.98) 
Unemployment -0.03 (-2.61) *** Number of Observations 8325
F(337, 7987) 31,5
R-squared 0.5114
Children 0.06 (8.00) ***
Foreigner -0.01 (-0.39) 
Professional Career
Professional Status
Workplace Characteristics
Individual Characteristics
Education and Continuous Training
School Attainment
Vocational Training
25This confirms the stronger bivarate correlations between the four external training variables and earn-
ings in comparison to the three internal training variables, see table A5.
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Table 8 continued
Professional Experience 0.00 (0.62) Professional Experience 0.01 (1.33) 
Professional Experience 
Squared 0.00 (1.00) Professional Experience Squared -0.00 (-1.98) **
Company Tenure -0.01 (-4.21) *** Company Tenure 0.00 (0.54) 
Company Tenure Squared 0.00 (3.82) *** Company Tenure Squared -0.00 (-0.27) 
Computer Work Station 0.02 (0.73) Computer Work Station 0.01 (0.34) 
Temporary Work -0.04 (-0.77) Temporary Work 0.01 (0.19) 
Good Economic Situation 0.04 (2.49) ** Good Economic Situation -0.04 (-1.38) 
Overtime -0.03 (-1.55) Overtime 0.01 (0.30) 
Profit-Sharing 0.06 (2.44) ** Profit-Sharing -0.04 (-1.02) 
Incentive Wage -0.02 (-1.04) Incentive Wage 0.01 (0.28) 
Without School Leaving 
Certificate 0.00 (0.07) Without School Leaving Certificate -0.05 (-0.56) 
Lower Secondary School -0.00 (-0.12) Lower Secondary School -0.06 (-2.18) **
Entrance Examination for 
University for Applied Sciences 0.02 (0.58) 
Entrance Examination for University 
for Applied Sciences 0.24 (0.55) 
High School Diploma 0.03 (0.85) High School Diploma -0.02 (-0.38) 
Skilled Blue-Collar Worker -0.04 (-0.53) Skilled Blue-Collar Worker -0.02 (-0.34) 
Assistant Foreman -0.27 (-2.12) ** Assistant Foreman 0.10 (1.16) 
Master/Foreman 0.08 (0.64) Master/Foreman -0.05 (-0.46) 
Unskilled White-Collar Worker 0.01 (0.14) Unskilled White-Collar Worker -0.07 (-0.67) 
White-Collar Worker with Simple 
Tasks -0.09 (-0.86) 
White-Collar Worker with Simple 
Tasks 0.04 (0.4) 
White-Collar Worker with Difficult 
Tasks 0.06 (0.58) 
White-Collar Worker with Difficult 
Tasks -0.11 (-1.44) 
High-Skilled White-Collar Worker 0.08 (0.81) High-Skilled White-Collar Worker -0.07 (-0.83) 
Executive White-Collar Worker 0.03 (0.22) Executive White-Collar Worker 0.02 (0.15) 
Civil Servant in Clerical Grade 0.11 (0.97) Civil Servant in Clerical Grade -0.27 (-2.88) ***
Civil Servant in Higher Service -0.01 (-0.11) Civil Servant in Higher Service 0.01 (0.13) 
Civil Servant in Senior Service -0.13 (-0.97) Civil Servant in Senior Service 0.00 (0.02) 
***, (**,*) signals a level of significance of 1% (5%, 10%) (t-values in parentheses are based on 
heteroscedasticity robust standard errors)
Source: BIBB-IAB 1998/99, own calculations.
Following control variables have been added: size of firm (6), federal state (10), residence community (2), 
economic sector (46), demand for specific training (5), job contents (13) and a constant.
Professional Status
School Attainment
Interaction Variables - Internal Training
School Attainment
Professional Status
Interaction Variables - External Training
Analogously to the analysis above, also in this specification we have to take endogeneity
of training into account. Hence, we estimate a regression with instrumental variables for
the two training factors. Selection into the two types of training differs, as can be seen
in the appendix (tables A9 and A10), where the regression equations of selection into
internal and external training are shown. The identifying variables “need for training”
and “restructuring” and their coefficients as well as all other determinants of internal
and external training are reported in the tables. Participation in external training is
explained much better by the right hand side variables than participation in internal
training, as indicated by the adjusted R2 of 0.43 (0.17) for the estimation of participation
in external (internal) training. The identifying variables also vary slightly between internal
and external training. Restructuring of the workplace suggests involvement in either
kind of training. Likewise, if employees report a need for training in specific topics, this
increases the probability that they have taken part in training before. The demand for
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training in mathematics reduces the probability of participation in internal as well as in
external training during the last two years. School attainment and professional experience
are of no importance in determining selection into internal training, while they are some
of the main determinants indicating participation in external training. Another crucial
determinant of internal training is firm size, which in contrast is no important determinant
of participation in external training. Likewise, Bartel (1995) finds an increasing training
incidence with length of services for core training, while the incidence of the other training
forms decreases significantly. Lynch (1992) finds higher training incidence with experience
for company-provided training, while the incidence of off-the-job training decreases with
tenure in her estimation. Employees with temporary contracts are very unlikely to receive
either kind of training. Professional status and vocational training dummies determine
attendance in both types of training.
The results of the instrumental variable regression are given in table 8. The impact
of external training on earnings increases after correcting for the selection bias, while the
t-value decreases but nevertheless stays significant. The effect of participation in internal
training on earnings stays insignificant. The endogeneity correction therefore has the
same effect on external training as in our first model with training participation, i.e. the
results in the first part are driven by the external training types. The coefficients are not
directly comparable since we use a dummy (0,1-variable) first, while later the training
factors range from -1 to +4 with mean zero, depending on how many different training
types were attended. The coefficients of the other explanatory variables in the extended
income equation including the two types of training do not deviate from the model with
the training dummy, and the adjusted R2 remains at 51 percent. Interaction terms of
internal training and the covariates and external training and covariates differ. While
company tenure has a negative impact on the return to external training, it is insignificant
for internal training. In contrast, professional experience has a positive (but decreasing)
impact on returns to internal training, and the interaction terms of external training and
the experience variables are insignificant. If the firm is in a good economic situation,
participation in external but not in internal training induces a higher wage mark-up.
5 What does the literature find?
The analysis above provides evidence for the hypothesis that heterogeneity of employees,
their workplaces, and training forms have to be taken into account when estimating the
individual returns to investment in continuous training. In order to provide a comprehen-
sive picture of the effects of training, it is also important to look at the employer side and
the productivity effects of training. The title by Dearden, Reed and Van Reenen (2000)
“Who gains when workers train?” suggests that the shares of the rent generated by train-
ing, that can be appropriated by employers and employees, can be measured. As they do
not have appropriate data combining the necessary information on employees and firms
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as well as training behavior, their evidence is more indirect, however. By comparing the
wage and the productivity effects of training in different economic sectors between 1983
and 1996 in the UK, they conclude that the increase in wages is less than half the increase
in value added per worker. A comparable result is obtained by Hempell (2003) using the
Mannheim Innovation Panel data for the German services sector in the period 1994-1998.
Loewenstein and Spletzer (1997) find that the average return to formal training at a pre-
vious employer exceeds the return to past formal training at the current employer. This
strand of the literature therefore shows that the rent generated from training is distributed
between employer and employee. An exception is the result by Mincer (1991) who com-
pares the effect of training on productivity with the effect on income. In his analysis, the
impact of training on employee’s income is positive but negative on turnover. This implies
that the employees can reap the entire rent from training.
Several other papers report the productivity and wage effects of training but do not
relate these effects to rent sharing between the employees trained and the employer, see the
literature survey by Bartel (2000). We specifically look at both strands of the literature,
differentiating between training forms in order to evaluate how our results fit in.
5.1 Literature Based on Individual Data
A summary of recent work on training with individual data is presented in table 9, men-
tioning the types of training used, estimation methods, and results. Studies differentiating
between different types of training have used various definitions, depending on the data
they use. Loewenstein and Spletzer (1997) did not find any systematic difference in the
wage returns to general and specific training provided by the current employer. They
trace this result back to measurement error in training and to the fact that rent sharing
between employer and employee takes place for both kinds of training. Closest to our
definition of training forms is Lynch (1992). She uses on-the-job and off-the-job training
and analyzes U.S. data on young employees (National Longitudinal Survey Youth Cohort).
Additionally, she distinguishes whether training was received during previous or current
employment, and she has information on the duration of training spells. Her results dif-
fer from ours: she does not find a significant effect of training off-the-job during current
employment. The positive effect of training on-the-job during current employment turns
insignificant when she uses the Heckman correction for sample selection. The latter result
is similar to our findings. The differences in the first result might be due to the data she
uses, where only young people are included. Our results indicate that the positive wage
effects of external training mainly accrue to more experienced and skilled employees. It
can be assumed that our internal training measures mainly take place during work hours,
while the external training variables take place during leisure time. Pischke (2001) there-
fore finds comparable results in a fixed effects panel estimation. Training during leisure
time has a positive impact on earnings growth, while training during work hours has no
effect in his estimations.
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Table 9 Studies using Different Training Types
Literature using Individual Data
Study Endogenous Variable Result: types of training in bold
Bartel (1995) wage growth Career advancement*: OLS(+)** IV(0) Employee development: OLS(+) IV(++)
Blundell, Dearden and 
Meghir(1999) wage and wage growth
Employer provided: OLS(+) IV(++)
Non-employer provided: OLS(0) IV(-)
Loewenstein and 
Spletzer (1998) wage
General: current job(+) previous job(++)
Specific: current job(+) previous job (0)
Lynch(1992) wage
Off-the-job: current job OLS(0) 
Heckman*** (0) previous job OLS(+)
On-the-job: current job OLS(+) 
Heckman(0) previous job OLS(0) 
Heckman (0)
Pfeiffer and Reize 
(2001) earnings
Formal(+) Nonformal(+) Switching 
Regression Model
Pischke(2001) earnings growth
During Leisure Time(+) During Work 
Hours(0)
 fixed effects panel regression
Literature using Firm Data
Study Endogenous Variable Result: types of training in bold
Barrett and O'Connell 
(2001) productivity growth General:OLS(+), Specific:OLS(0)
Black and Lynch (1996) sales
Percentage of Formal Training outside 
working hours in total training: OLS(+) 
Computer Training: OLS(+) Teamwork 
Training: OLS(0) Supervisor Training: 
OLS(0)
Black and Lynch (1997) labour productivity Several Training Measures: OLS(0)
Zwick (2002) value added
Formal Training: OLS(+) Fixed 
Effects(++) Training On-the-Job:OLS(-) 
Fixed Effects(0)
*Career advancement consists of core and technical training. **(+) positive effect (++) higher positive effect (-) 
negative effect (0) insignificant effect ***Heckman correction for sample selection.
5.2 Literature Based on Firm Data
Most papers on the productivity impact of training only look at the impact of a train-
ing dummy or the training intensity, while effects of different training measures are not
distinguished. Black and Lynch (1996) and Dearden, Reed and Van Reenen (2000) find
that training off the job26 has a productivity effect but not on-the-job training, and that
computer training is more effective than teamwork training and supervisor training. The
authors conclude that the insignificant impact of internal training on productivity is ei-
ther due to the output loss since it reduces hours worked or that external training is more
advanced training which results in a stronger productivity increase of the participants.
Barrett and O’Connell (2001) show that general training significantly increases productiv-
ity, while specific training has no impact on productivity. They argue that the employees
devote greater effort to general training than to specific training because it is transferable
or regarded as a gift from the employer. A higher effort leads to a better human capital
effect of training and analogously to higher productivity. Zwick (2002) finds for Germany
that mainly formal internal and external training courses increase productivity, whereas
26In this case, on-the-job and off-the-job training refers rather to the formality of training than to the
location.
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self-induced learning, such as reading work-related literature or e-learning and quality cir-
cles, have lower but still significant positive effects. Training on the job, job rotation and
participation in trade fairs did not have positive productivity effects. Again, it seems that
training measures with higher general contents have a stronger productivity effect than
training measures with higher firm-specific contents.
6 Summary of Results
Our main results are:
1. The impact of participation in training on income is significantly positive. Training
comprises any of the following: courses and seminars, participation in trade fairs,
lectures, on-the-job training, quality circles, special tasks, and reading of specialist
literature. Correcting for the endogeneity bias, the average treatment effect increases
from 0.10 to 0.15.
2. The effect of training on earnings differs for heterogeneous agents. High-skilled
workers profit more from training than low-skilled workers, job entrants obtain a
higher earnings increase after participation in training than workers with a long job
tenure, and workers with a temporary contract profit less from training than those
with a permanent job contract. If also the workers with no positive wage effects
experience a productivity increase induced by training, the employers reap all the
gains from training.
3. The increase in the income effects of training if endogeneity is taken into account,
compared with the case where selection is assumed to be random, suggests that
our instrumental variables reduce the measurement error in the OLS regression and
capture heterogeneous training returns more properly. This is plausible because our
dummy variable for training inadequately captures training intensity and training
effort. The third possibility for this phenomenon, a negative selection into training,
seems unlikely given previous empirical evidence that training is seldom remedial.
4. Without controlling for endogeneity, external training (i.e. participation at trade
fairs, lectures, courses and seminars, and reading of specialist literature) has a sig-
nificant positive impact on wages, while the wage effect of internal training (i.e. on
the job training, quality circles, and special tasks) is insignificant. Taking endogene-
ity into account and instrumenting the training decision, the coefficient of external
training rises from 0.05 to 0.13, internal training stays insignificant. Hence, par-
ticipation in internal training does not translate into higher earnings. Here again,
only the employer seems to skim productivity increases from investments in human
capital (again assuming that employees’ productivity is increased by the training).
Therefore, only external training has a significant and positive impact on earnings
and drives the result derived with a dummy for training participation.
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5. Our contribution can only present indirect evidence on who gains when workers
train. We have been able to answer the question “who gains from training?” in
the sense of which type of employees profits from higher wages after participation
in training. With our data, we were not able to present evidence for rent sharing
after investment in training between employer and employee. Nevertheless, using the
indirect information of income increases and assuming that productivity increases
after training, we can make inferences about whether also the employer profits from
training. Possibly, employers reap all the gains from the internal training measures
analyzed in the second part of the paper. This is also suggested by the empirical
literature using firm data. In order to obtain clearer evidence, linked employer-
employee panel data with detailed information on type, length and cost of training
would be required, however.
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7 Appendix
Table A1 List of Variables Used
Variable Share / Average Notes
Less than 600 DM 0.07%
Between 600 and 1000 DM 0.16%
Between 1000 and 1500 DM 0.56%
Between 1500 and 2000 DM 1.25%
Between 2000 and 2500 DM 4.31%
Between 2500 and 3000 DM 7.69%
Between 3000 and 3500 DM 11.87%
Between 3500 and 4000 DM 14.87%
Between 4000 and 4500 DM 14.48%
Between 4500 and 5000 DM 12.28%
Between 5000 and 5500 DM 7.59%
Between 5500 and 6000 DM 6.93%
Between 6000 and 7000 DM 7.58%
Between 7000 and 8000 DM 4.10%
Between 8000 and 9000 DM 2.52%
Between 9000 and 10000 DM 1.37%
Between 10000 and 15000 DM 1.73%
15000 DM and more 0.64%
Without School Leaving 
Certificate
2.51%
Lower Secondary School 51.23%
Intermediate Secondary School 24.75%
Entrance Examination for 
University for Applied Sciences
7.60%
High School Diploma 13.91%
Without Professional Degree 12.63%
Full-Time Vocational School 2.22% Several years of professional training in school
Dual Apprenticeship 60.17% Several years of professional training in school and 
on the job
Master Craftman 11.34%
University of Applied Sciences 5.79%
University 7.85%
Courses and Seminars 26.72%
Trade Fair 18.09% Participation in trade fairs
Lecture 25.9% Participation in lectures
On-The-Job 16.70% Initial training on the job
Quality Circle 14.07% Participation in quality circles
Special Tasks 12.86% Tasks aiming at extending skills
Specialist Literature 26.11% Study of work-related literature
Professional Experience 22.69 years Years from first job until today
Company Tenure 13.86 years Years from starting to work for a company until today
Unemployment 27.43% Dummy = 1 if a person was ever unemployed, 
otherwise 0
Earnings
School Attainment
Vocational Training
Training
Professional Career
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Table A1 continued
Variable Share / Average Notes
Unskilled Blue-Collar Worker 15.63% Worker without professional degree
Skilled Blue-Collar Worker 27.18% Worker with degree from dual apprenticeship system 
or full-time vocational school
Assistant Foreman 3.60%
Master/Foreman 3.25%
Unskilled White-Collar Worker 2.22% White-Collar worker with basic tasks
White-Collar Worker with Simple 
Tasks
3.98%
White-Collar Worker with 
Difficult Tasks
11.36%
High-Skilled White-Collar 
Worker
16.00%
Executive White-Collar Worker 4.97%
Civil Servant in Clerical Grade 4.55%
Civil Servant in Higher Service 3.93%
Civil Servant in Senior Service 2.07%
Computer Work Station 48.21% Work routine includes using the computer 
Temporary Work 4.87%
Good Economic Situation 59.04% Dummy = 1 if the company is in a good economic 
situation, otherwise 0
Overtime 78.34% Dummy = 1 if a person works overtime, otherwise 0
Profit-Sharing 7.94%
Incentive Wage 21.62%
Job Content 13 Categories: training, testing, counseling, 
supervising, repairing, procurement, organisiation, 
marketing, research, negotiating, developing, 
manufacturing, monitoring
Children 49.98% Dummy = 1 if a person has at least one child, 
otherwise 0
Foreigner 5.43% Dummy = 1 if a person does not have a German 
Nationality, otherwise 0
Demand for Specific Training 12 Categories: need for training in presentation 
techniques, foreign languages, logistics, 
Management, Controlling, Mathematics, German, 
System Engineering, Computer Engineering, Other 
Engineering, Safety at Work, Medicine
Changes in the Workplace 2 Categories: Downsizing, Restructuring
Size of Firm 7 Categories: number of employees is 1-4, 5-9, 10-
49, 50-99, 100-499, 500-999 and 1000 and above
Residence Community 3 Categories: communities with 50 000 and above 
inhabitants, hinterland of large cities and other 
communities with less than 50 000 inhabitants
Federal State 11 Categories: all Federal States of West Germany
Economic Sector 46 Categories
Professional Status
Workplace Characteristics
Individual Characteristics
Identifying Variables
Other Variables
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Table A2 Comparison: Interval Regression (INTREG) vs. Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS) - Estimates of the Extended Earnings Equation
INTREG OLS INTREG OLS
Professional 
Experience 0.01 (11.56) *** 0.01 (11.02) ***
Trade Fair 0.08 (9.95) *** 0.09 (9.86) *** Professional Experience Squared -0.00 (-7.76) *** -0.00 (-7.35) ***
Lecture 0.06 (7.13) *** 0.06 (6.99) *** Company Tenure 0.00 (10.43) *** 0.00 (9.88) ***
On-The-Job -0.03 (-3.95) *** -0.03 (-3.83) *** Unemployment -0.03 (-4.35) *** -0.03 (-4.17) ***
Quality Circle 0.03 (3.32) *** 0.26 (3.15) ***
Special Tasks 0.02 (2.18) ** 0.02 (2.14) **
Specialist Literature 0.06 (8.12) *** 0.06 (7.89) *** Computer Work Station 0.09 (12.41) *** 0.09 (11.97) ***
Temporary Work -0.07 (-4.42) *** -0.07 (-4.13) ***
Without School 
Leaving Certificate -0.03 (-1.45) -0.03 (-1.43) 
Good Economic 
Situation 0.05 (6.47) *** 0.05 (6.21) ***
Lower Secondary 
School -0.05 (-6.13) *** -0.05 (-6.11) *** Overtime 0.06 (8.09) *** 0.06 (8.00) ***
Intermediate 
Secondary School Reference Reference Profit-Sharing 0.10 (7.92) *** 0.10 (7.76) ***
Entrance Examination 
for University for 
Applied Sciences
0.09 (6.64) *** 0.14 (5.57) *** Incentive Wage 0.03 (3.71) *** 0.03 (3.62) ***
High School Diploma 0.11 (8.48) *** 0.11 (8.35) ***
Without Professional 
Degree -0.08 (-3.61) *** -0.03 (-1.43) Children 0.07 (10.81) *** 0.07 (10.58) ***
Full-Time Vocational 
School Reference Reference
Apprenticeship -0.00 (-0.03) -0.00 (-0.20) Number of Observations 10003 10003
Master Craftman 0.08 (3.75) *** 0.08 (3.52) *** Chi-squared Stat. 8513.97
University for Applied 
Sciences 0.14 (5.83) *** 0.14 (5.57) *** R-squared 0.4691
University 0.27 (10.31) *** 0.27 (10.01) ***
Individual Characteristics
Following control variables have been added: size of firm (6), federal state (10), residence community (2), economic 
sector (46), demand for specific training (5), job contents (13) and a constant.
*** (**, *) signals a level of significance of 1% (5%, 10%) (t-values and z-values in parentheses are based on 
heteroscedasticity robust standard errors)
Source: BIBB-IAB 1998/99, own calculations.
School Attainment
 Vocational Training 
Professional CareerEducation and Continuous Training
Training
Workplace Characteristics
Table A3 Correlations* between Types of Training and Income
Trade Fair Lecture Specialist Literature On The Job Quality Circle
Special 
Tasks
Courses 
and 
Seminars
Income
Trade Fair 1.00
Lecture 0.41 1.00
Specialist Literature 0.41 0.49 1.00
On-The-Job 0.06 0.11 0.11 1.00
Quality Circle 0.13 0.20 0.21 0.16 1.00
Special Tasks 0.16 0.24 0.24 0.19 0.17 1.00
Courses and Seminars 0.26 0.50 0.36 0.12 0.28 0.24 1.00
Income 0.31 0.38 0.38 0.03 0.19 0.19 0.31 1.00
* correlations are all significant at 5 percent level  Source: BIBB-IAB 1998/99, own calculations.
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Table A4 Standard Earnings Equation & Extended Earnings Equation
including Different Types of Training
log (Earnings)
Professional Experience 0.02 (17.50) *** 0.02 (15.56) ***
Professional Experience Squared -0.00 (-11.52) *** -0.00 (-9.95) ***
Without School Leaving Certificate -0.07 (-2.77) *** -0.05 (-1.80) *
Lower Secondary School -0.10 (-10.84) *** -0.06 (-6.89) ***
Intermediate Secondary School
Entrance Examination for University 
for Applied Sciences
0.15 (8.05) *** 0.11 (6.36) ***
High School Diploma 0.17 (9.87) *** 0.14 (8.70) ***
Without Professional Degree -0.15 (-5.46) *** -0.12 (-4.53) ***
Full-Time Vocational School
Apprenticeship -0.00 (-0.15) -0.01 (-0.56)
Master Craftman 0.17 (6.12) *** 0.10 (3.64) ***
University for Applied Sciences 0.22 (6.99) *** 0.14 (4.71) ***
University 0.33 (10.25) *** 0.25 (7.96) ***
Courses and Seminars 0.05 (5.80) ***
Trade Fair 0.10 (9.65) ***
Lecture 0.09 (8.62) ***
On-The-Job -0.01 (-0.92)
Quality Circle 0.07 (6.78) ***
Special Tasks 0.04 (4.20) ***
Specialist Literature 0.08 (8.04) ***
Number of Observations
F (11, 8313) / F (18, 8306)
R-squared
 Earnings Equation 
Including Training
8325
257.91
0.3750
School Attainment
Vocational Training
Training
Coefficient
Earnings Equation
8325
295.66
Coefficient
Reference
Reference
Reference
Reference
0.3155
***, (**,*) signals a level of significance of 1% (5%, 10%) (t-values in parentheses 
are based on heteroscedasticity robust standard errors)
Source: BIBB-IAB 1998/99, own calculations.
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Table A5 Extended Earnings Equation with Control Variables - Different
Types of Training included
Unskilled Blue-Collar Worker Reference
Courses and Seminars 0.00 (0.37) Skilled Blue-Collar Worker 0.07 (4.92) ***
Trade Fair 0.05 (4.86) *** Assistant Foreman 0.08 (4.15) ***
Lecture 0.04 (4.26) *** Master/Foreman 0.16 (6.61) ***
On-The-Job -0.01 (-1.54) Unskilled White-Collar Worker 0.06 (2.98) ***
Quality Circle 0.02 (2.06) ** White-Collar Worker with Simple Tasks 0.03 (1.56) 
Special Tasks 0.01 (0.76) White-Collar Worker with Difficult Tasks 0.1 (6.29) ***
Specialist Literature 0.04 (4.80) *** High-Skilled White-Collar Worker 0.21 (12.14) ***
Executive White-Collar Worker 0.3 (12.22) ***
Without School Leaving Certificate -0.01 (-0.45) Civil Servant in Clerical Grade 0.06 (2.52) **
Lower Secondary School -0.02 (-2.37) ** Civil Servant in Higher Service 0.14 (5.43) ***
Intermediate Secondary School Reference Civil Servant in Senior Service 0.3 (10.29) ***
Entrance Examination for 
University for Applied Sciences 0.05 (3.47) ***
High School Diploma 0.07 (4.81) ***
Computer Work Station 0.04 (4.41) ***
Without Professional Degree -0.06 (-2.30) ** Temporary Work -0.07 (-3.4) ***
Full-Time Vocational School Reference Good Economic Situation 0.04 (5.21) ***
Apprenticeship -0.01 (-0.43) Overtime 0.04 (5.49) ***
Master Craftman 0.03 (1.08) Profit-Sharing 0.07 (5.11) ***
University for Applied Sciences 0.09 (3.21) *** Incentive Wage 0.03 (3.54) ***
University 0.19 (6.36) ***
Children 0.07 (9.58) ***
Professional Experience 0.01 (8.92) *** Foreigner -0.04 (-2.33) **
Professional Experience Squared -0.00 (-6.49) ***
Company Tenure 0.01 (5.16) *** Number of Observations 8325
Company Tenure Squared -0.00 (-2.08) ** F(122, 8202) 71.57
Unemployment -0.03 (-3.75) *** R-squared 0.5021
Professional Status
***, (**,*) signals a level of significance of 1% (5%, 10%) (t-values in parentheses are based on 
heteroscedasticity robust standard errors).
Source: BIBB-IAB 1998/99, own calculations.
Education and Continuous Training
Training
Following control variables have been added: size of firm (6), federal state (10), residence community (2), 
economic sector (46), demand for specific training (5), job contents (13) and a constant.
Workplace Characteristics
Individual Characteristics
School Attainment
Vocational Training
Professional Career
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Table A6 Extended Earnings Equation with Control Variables - Training
included as a Dummy
T ra in ing 0 .05  (6 .21 ) *** C om pu te r W ork  
S ta tion
0.04  (5 .06 ) ***
T em pora ry W ork -0 .06  (-3 .31 ) ***
W ithou t S choo l 
Leav ing  C ertif ica te
-0 .01  (-0 .71 ) G ood  E c onom ic  
S itua tion
0.04  (5 .36 ) ***
Low er S econda ry 
S choo l
-0 .03  (-3 .38) *** O ve rtim e 0.05  (6 .26 ) ***
In term edia te  
S econda ry S choo l
R efe renc e P ro fit-S haring 0.08  (6 .45 ) ***
E n trance  
E xam ina tion  fo r 
U n ivers ity fo r  
A pp lied  S c ienc es
0 .06  (4 .88 ) *** Inc en tive  W age 0.02  (3 .01 ) ***
H igh  S c hoo l 
D ip lom a
0 .08  (5 .85 ) ***
W ithou t 
P ro fess iona l 
D eg ree
-0 .05  (-2 .02 ) ** C h ild ren 0 .07  (11 .07 ) ***
F u ll-T im e  
V ocationa l S choo l
R efe renc e F ore igne rs -0 .04  (-2 .62 ) ***
A ppren tic es h ip -0 .00  (-0 .17 ) 
M as ter C ra ftm an 0.04  (1 .91 ) * N um ber o f 
O bse rva tions
10003
U n ivers ity fo r  
A pp lied  S c ienc es
0 .10  (3 .79 ) *** F (111 , 9891 ) 88 .47
U n ivers ity 0 .20  (7 .52 ) *** R -squa red 0 .5044
P ro fess iona l 
E xper ience
0 .01 (10 .11 ) ***
P ro fess iona l 
E xper ience  
S qua red
-0 .00  (-7 .21) ***
C om pany T enu re 0 .01  (5 .51 ) ***
C om pany T enu re  
S qua red
-0 .00  (-2 .12 ) **
U nem p loym ent -0 .03  (-4 .14) ***
P ro fess io n a l C areer ***, (**,*) s igna ls  a  leve l o f 
s ign if icanc e o f 1%  (5% , 10% ) (t-
va lues  in  paren theses  are  based  on  
he te roscedas tic ity robus t s tanda rd  
errors )
S ou rce : B IB B -IA B  1998 /99 , ow n  
ca lcu la tions .
F o llow ing  con tro l va riab les  have  
been  added : s ize  o f f irm  (6 ), federa l 
s ta te  (10 ), res idence com m unity (2 ), 
ec onom ic  sec to r (46), dem and  fo r 
spec if ic  tra in ing  (5), job  con ten ts  (13 ) 
and  a  cons tan t.
E d u catio n  an d  C o n tin u o u s  T ra in in g W o rkp lace C h arac te ris tics
S c hoo l A tta inm en t
V oca tiona l T ra in ing In d iv id u a l C h aracte ristics
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Table A7 Extended Earnings Equation with Interaction Variables - Training
included as a Dummy and in Interaction Variables
Training 0.06 (6.54) *** Children 0.06 (6.03) ***
Foreigner -0.05 (-2.77) ***
Without School Leaving 
Certificate 0.01 (0.24) 
Lower Secondary School -0.00 (-0.04) 
Intermediate Secondary School Reference Professional Experience 0.01 (1.90) *
Entrance Examination for 
University for Applied Sciences 0.03 (0.77) Professional Experience Squared -0.00 (-0.50) 
College Entrance Exam 0.08 (2.75) *** Company Tenure -0.01 (-2.48) **
Company Tenure Squared 0.00 (1.35)
Without Professional Degree -0.07 (-1.78) * Computer Work Station 0.03 (1.45) 
Full-Time Vocational School Reference Temporary Work -0.05 (-1.36) 
Apprenticeship -0.02 (-0.44) Good Economic Situation 0.02 (1.07) 
Master Craftman 0.02 (0.46) Overtime -0.01 (-0.74) 
University for Applied Sciences 0.09 (1.49) Profit-Sharing 0.02 (0.81) 
University 0.15 (2.68) *** Incentive Wage -0.04 (-2.75) ***
Without School Leaving 
Certificate -0.04 (-0.85) 
Professional Experience 0.01 (4.85) *** Lower Secondary School -0.05 (-3.01) ***
Professional Experience Squared -0.00 (-4.16) ***
Entrance Examination for 
University for Applied Sciences 0.04 (1.04) 
Company Tenure 0.01 (5.23) *** High School Diploma 0.00 (0.16) 
Company Tenure Squared -0.00 (-2.26) **
Unemployment -0.02 (-1.80) * Skilled Blue-Collar Worker -0.02 (-0.68) 
Assistant Foreman -0.00 (-0.07) 
Master/Foreman 0.43 (0.79) 
Unskilled Blue-Collar Worker Reference Unskilled White-Collar Worker -0.04 (-0.98) 
Skilled Blue-Collar Worker 0.07 (4.36) *** White-Collar Worker with Simple Tasks -0.03 (-0.86) 
Assistant Foreman 0.07 (2.58) *** White-Collar Worker with Difficult Tasks -0.07 (-2.06) **
Master/Foreman 0.13 (2.76) *** High-Skilled White-Collar Worker 0.02 (0.70) 
Unskilled White-Collar Worker 0.09 (3.29) *** Executive White-Collar Worker 0.02 (0.28) 
White-Collar Worker with Simple 
Tasks 0.05 (2.02) ** Civil Servant in Clerical Grade -0.15 (-3.51) ***
White-Collar Worker with Difficult 
Tasks 0.16 (6.50) *** Civil Servant in Higher Service -0.14 (-1.95) *
High-Skilled White-Collar Worker 0.20 (7.60) *** Civil Servant in Senior Service -0.27 (-3.72) ***
Executive White-Collar Worker 0.30 (6.43) ***
Civil Servant in Clerical Grade 0.16 (4.68) *** Number of Observations 10003
Civil Servant in Higher Service 0.23 (3.55) *** F(220, 9781)
Civil Servant in Senior Service 0.55 (8.26) *** R-squared 0.5169
Computer Work Station 0.03 (1.82) *
Temporary Work -0.04 (-1.59) 
Good Economic Situation 0.03 (2.34) **
Overtime 0.05 (4.25) ***
Profit-Sharing 0.06 (2.41) **
Incentive Wage 0.05 (3.95) ***
Following control variables have been added: size 
of firm (6), federal state (10), residence community 
(2), economic sector (46), demand for specific 
training (5), job contents (13) and a constant.
School Attainment
Professional Status
Individual Characteristics
Interaction Variables
Professional Status
Workplace Characteristics ***, (**,*) signals a level of significance of 1% (5%, 
10%) (t-values in parentheses are based on 
heteroscedasticity robust standard errors)
Source: BIBB-IAB 1998/99, own calculations.
Education and Continuous Training
School Attainment
Vocational Training
Professional Career
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Table A8 Extended Earnings Equation with Internal and External Training
External Training 0.05 (6.93) *** Unskilled Blue-Collar Worker Reference
Internal Training -0.01 (-1.75) * Skilled Blue-Collar Worker 0.04 (1.91) *
Assistant Foreman 0.04 (1.60) 
Without School Leaving 
Certificate -0.01 (-0.28) Master/Foreman 0.13 (4.43) ***
Lower Secondary School -0.03 (-2.97) *** Unskilled White-Collar Worker 0.06 (1.96) **
Intermediate Secondary 
School Reference
White-Collar Worker with 
Simple Tasks 0.00 (0.12) 
Entrance Examination for 
University for Applied 
Sciences
0.04 (2.21) ** White-Collar Worker with Difficult Tasks 0.09 (4.03) ***
High School Diploma 0.07 (4.25) *** High-Skilled White-Collar Worker 0.17 (7.45) ***
Executive White-Collar Worker 0.23 (7.39) ***
Without Professional Degree -0.07 (-2.11) ** Civil Servant in Clerical Grade 0.04 (1.52) 
Full-Time Vocational School Reference Civil Servant in Higher Service 0.12 (3.53) ***
Apprenticeship -0.02 (-0.88) Civil Servant in Senior Service 0.32 (7.81) ***
Master Craftman 0.02 (0.62) 
University for Applied 
Sciences 0.07 (2.02) ** Workplace Characteristics
University 0.15 (4.27) *** Computer Work Station 0.04 (4.53) ***
Temporary Work -0.08 (-3.59) ***
Good Economic Situation 0.04 (5.02) ***
Professional Experience 0.01 (9.39) *** Overtime 0.04 (4.79) ***
Professional Experience 
Squared -0.00 (-6.70) *** Profit-Sharing 0.06 (4.33) ***
Company Tenure 0.01 (5.08) *** Incentive Wage 0.03 (3.37) ***
Company Tenure Squared -0.00 (-2.18) **
Unemployment -0.03 (-3.33) *** Number of Observations 8325
F(335, 7988)
R-squared 0.5245
Children 0.07 (9.43) ***
Foreigner -0.02 (-0.65) 
Professional Status
Professional Career
Individual Characteristics
Education and Continuous Training
School Attainment
Vocational Training
36
Table A8 continued
Professional Experience 0.00 (0.53) Professional Experience 0.00 (1.98) **
Professional Experience 
Squared -0.00 (-0.87) 
Professional Experience 
Squared -0.00 (-0.25) 
Company Tenure 0.00 (1.68) * Company Tenure -0.01 (-4.42) ***
Computer Work Station 0.00 (0.27) Computer Work Station 0.01 (1.28) 
Temporary Work -0.00 (-0.14) Temporary Work -0.04 (-1.40) 
Good Economic Situation -0.01 (-1.22) Good Economic Situation 0.02 (2.10) **
Overtime -0.00 (-0.12) Overtime -0.01 (-1.25) 
Profit-Sharing -0.00 (-0.38) Profit-Sharing 0.01 (0.84) 
Incentive Wage 0.00 (0.02) Incentive Wage -0.02 (-2.44) **
Without School Leaving 
Certificate -0.01 (-0.28) 
Without School Leaving 
Certificate -0.01 (-0.43) 
Lower Secondary School -0.03 (-2.99) *** Lower Secondary School -0.02 (-1.73) *
Entrance Examination for 
University for Applied 
Sciences
-0.03 (-2.35) **
Entrance Examination for 
University for Applied 
Sciences
0.01 (0.88) 
High School Diploma -0.03 (-2.04) ** High School Diploma 0.02 (1.42) 
Skilled Blue-Collar Worker -0.03 (-1.87) * Skilled Blue-Collar Worker -0.01 (-0.54) 
Assistant Foreman -0.00 (-0.14) Assistant Foreman -0.04 (-1.38) 
Master/Foreman -0.02 (-0.89) Master/Foreman 0.00 (0.06) 
Unskilled White-Collar Worker 0.00 (0.12) Unskilled White-Collar Worker -0.03 (-0.78) 
White-Collar Worker with 
Simple Tasks -0.01 (-0.66) 
White-Collar Worker with 
Simple Tasks -0.04 (-1.22) 
White-Collar Worker with 
Difficult Tasks -0.03 (-1.62) 
White-Collar Worker with 
Difficult Tasks -0.05 (-1.9) *
High-Skilled White-Collar 
Worker -0.02 (-1.32) 
High-Skilled White-Collar 
Worker -0.02 (-0.61) 
Executive White-Collar 
Worker -0.07 (-2.69) *** Executive White-Collar Worker -0.00 (-0.06) 
Civil Servant in Clerical Grade -0.03 (-1.40) Civil Servant in Clerical Grade -0.10 (-3.27) ***
Civil Servant in Higher 
Service -0.02 (-0.83) Civil Servant in Higher Service -0.06 (-1.97) **
Civil Servant in Senior 
Service -0.05 (-1.51) Civil Servant in Senior Service -0.09 (-2.48) **
School Attainment
Interaction Variables - External Training
Professional Status Professional Status
School Attainment
Interaction Variables - Internal Training
Following control variables have been added: size of firm (6), federal state (10), residence community (2), 
economic sector (46), demand for specific training (5) and a constant.
***, (**,*) signals a level of significance of 1% (5%, 10%) (t-values in parentheses are based on 
heteroscedasticity robust standard errors)
Source: BIBB-IAB 1998/99, own calculations.
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Table A9 Selection into Internal Training
Restructuring 0.24 (7.32) *** Unskilled Blue-Collar Worker Reference
Skilled Blue-Collar Worker 0.06 (2.03) **
Mathematics -0.12 (-2.21) ** Assistant Foreman 0.34 (5.29) ***
German 0.08 (1.23) Master/Foreman 0.05 (0.84) 
System Engineering 0.13 (1.85) * Unskilled White-Collar Worker -0.10 (-1.94) *
Computer Engineering 0.06 (1.32) 
White-Collar Worker with Simple 
Tasks -0.05 (-1.03) 
Other Engineering 0.26 (6.04) ***
White-Collar Worker with Difficult 
Tasks 0.11 (2.58) ***
Safety at Work 0.11 (2.77) *** High-Skilled White-Collar Worker 0.07 (1.68) *
Medicine 0.13 (1.66) * Executive White-Collar Worker -0.10 (-1.76) *
Civil Servant in Clerical Grade 0.22 (3.25) ***
Civil Servant in Higher Service 0.15 (2.05) **
School Attainment Civil Servant in Senior Service -0.02 (-0.19) 
Without School Leaving 
Certificate 0.03 (0.44) 
Lower Secondary School 0.00 (0.13) 
Intermediate Secondary School Reference Computer Work Station 0.20 (7.55) ***
Entrance Examination for 
University for Applied Sciences -0.03 (-0.63) Temporary Work -0.11 (-2.75) ***
High School Diploma -0.02 (-0.55) Overtime 0.09 (4.31) ***
Incentive Wage 0.17 (6.45) ***
Without Professional Degree -0.03 (-0.47) 
Full-Time Vocational School Reference
Apprenticeship -0.02 (-0.33) Foreigner -0.04 (-1.16) 
Master Craftman -0.06 (-0.85) 
University for Applied Sciences -0.08 (-0.94) Number of Observations 9723
University -0.15 (-1.77) * F(102, 9620) 17.92
R-squared 0.1714
Professional Experience 0.00 (0.64)
Professional Experience Squared -0.00 (-2.51) **
Company Tenure 0.01 (-1.55)
Company Tenure Squared -0.00 (-1.59) 
Unemployment -0.00 (-0.20) 
Professional Career
Following control variables have been added: size of firm (6), federal state (10), residence community 
(2), economic sector (46), demand for specific training (5) and a constant.
***, (**,*) signals a level of significance of 1% (5%, 
10%) (t-values in parentheses are based on 
heteroscedasticity robust standard errors)
Source: BIBB-IAB 1998/99, own calculations
Professional StatusIdentifying Variables
Individual Characteristics
Workplace Characteristics
Training Needs
Education and Continuous Training
Vocational Training
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Table A10 Selection into External Training
Restructuring 0.07 (2.51) ** Unskilled Blue-Collar Worker Reference
Skilled Blue-Collar Worker 0.07 (3.65) ***
Mathematics -0.13 (-2.77) *** Assistant Foreman 0.17 (3.69) ***
German -0.13 (-2.66) *** Master/Foreman 0.35 (6.04) ***
System Engineering 0.21 (3.62) *** Unskilled White-Collar Worker 0.05 (1.31) 
Computer Engineering 0.17 (4.44) *** White-Collar Worker with Simple Tasks 0.04 (1.18) 
Other Engineering 0.19 (5.88) *** White-Collar Worker with Difficult Tasks 0.26 (8.02) ***
Safety at Work 0.15 (4.63) *** High-Skilled White-Collar Worker 0.66 (18.96) ***
Medicine 0.10 (1.45) Executive White-Collar Worker 0.72 (14.03) ***
Civil Servant in Clerical Grade 0.23 (4.52) ***
Civil Servant in Higher Service 0.54 (8.35) ***
Civil Servant in Senior Service 0.78 (9.78) ***
Without School Leaving -0.05 (-1.10) 
Lower Secondary School -0.05 (-2.55) **
Intermediate Secondary School Reference Computer Work Station 0.19 (8.87) ***
Entrance Examination for 
University for Applied Sciences 0.16 (4.08) *** Temporary Work -0.12 (-4.15) ***
High School Diploma 0.06 (1.57) Overtime 0.11 (6.25) ***
Incentive Wage 0.03 (1.48) 
Without Professional Degree -0.02 (-0.42) 
Full-Time Vocational School Reference
Apprenticeship 0.05 (0.91) Foreigner -0.11 (-4.73) ***
Master Craftman 0.29 (4.96) ***
University for Applied Sciences 0.31 (4.60) *** Number of Observations 9723
University 0.38 (5.24) *** F(112, 9610) 73.09
R-squared 0.4322
Professional Experience 0.01 (2.64) ***
Professional Experience Squared -0.00 (-3.40) ***
Company Tenure 0.02 (6.69) ***
Company Tenure Squared -0.00 (-4.70) ***
Unemployment -0.05 (-3.01) ***
Professional StatusIdentifying Variables
Workplace Characteristics
Individual Characteristics
Training Needs
Vocational Training
Professional Career
Education and Continuous Training
School Attainment
Following control variables have been added: size 
of firm (6), federal state (10), residence community 
(2), economic sector (46), demand for specific 
training (5), job contents (13) and a constant.
***, (**,*) signals a level of significance of 1% (5%, 
10%) (t-values in parentheses are based on 
heteroscedasticity robust standard errors)
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Table A11 Translation of Selected Variables
English German
Quality Circle Qualitätszirkel
Trade Fair Fachmesse
internship Praktikum
lecture Fachvortrag
Specialist Literature Fachliteratur
without school leaving 
certificate
Ohne Abschluss
lower secondary school Hauptschule
intermediate secondary school Realschule
entrance examination for 
university for applied sciences
Fachhochschulreife
high school diploma Abitur
without professional degree Ohne Ausbildung
full-time vocational school Berufsfachschule
apprenticeship Lehre
master craftsman Meister
university for applied sciences Fachhochschule
university Universität
unskilled blue-collar worker Angelernter Arbeiter
skilled blue-collar worker Facharbeiter
assistant foreman Vorarbeiter
master/foreman Meister
unskilled white-collar worker Ausführender Angestellter
white-collar worker with simple 
tasks
Angestellter mit einfacher Tätigkeit
white-collar worker with difficult 
tasks
Angestellter, der schwierige Aufgaben nach allgemeiner 
Anweisung selbstständig erledigt
high-skilled white collar worker Angestellter, der selbstständige Leistungen in 
verantwortungsvoller Tätigkeit erbringt oder begrenzte 
Verantwortung für die Tätigkeit anderer trägt
executive white collar worker Angestellter mit umfassenden Führungsaufgaben und 
Entscheidungsbefugnissen
civil servant in clerical grade Beamter im einfachen oder mittleren Dienst
civil servant in higher service Beamter im gehobenen Dienst
civil servant in senior service Beamter im höheren Dienst
Training
School Attainment
Vocational Training
Professional Status
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Figure A1 Participation in Training depending on Experience and Tenure
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